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Abstract
Learning is an essential part of life through which we accumulate experience, which then can help us to improve our ability to
solve problems. In economics experience can improve productivity. The concept of the experience curve as a form of
organizational learning was developed during the second half of the 20th century. It was especially promoted by the Boston
Consulting Group and found its way into most textbooks on management and strategic planning; empirical data have been
published for a number of industries. In the construction industry, however, very few data are available to support the concept.
The largest obstacle for all researchers is to obtain the cost information as these are typically not shared by companies.
Consequentially we have gathered cost data from four very large expressway bridges to study experience effects in construction
projects. These were built in Bangkok, Thailand, by the same joint venture for the same owner during the period from 1990 to
2000 using segmental bridge construction technology. The square meters of bridge deck serve as basic units and the four projects
comprise some three million of these, so that impacts of increasing experience could be observed. The data for all four projects
have been evaluated and adjusted for inflation. They support the idea that a cost reduction of 20% can be achieved. The cost
reductions must be actively pursued, there exists no automatic process.
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1. Learning and the experience curve
Learning is a ubiquitous fact of life. In many countries this has led to growth and productivity increases in
economics. Growth is typically explained by an increase in inputs (labor and capital) and by an improvement in
technology. Denison (1985) studied the sources of growth in a longitudinal study in the USA covering the years
from 1929 to 1982. During this time growth averaged 2.92% per year and 1.90 % could be attributed to growth in
inputs while increases in knowledge added 0.66% and economies of scale 0.26%. Considering the construction
industry we need to switch to the economic minimum principle (production of a given output with decreasing
inputs). From economics we know what to watch out for when looking for productivity gains and lower costs:
knowledge growth and economies of scale.
A large number of business studies have shown that in many industries unit costs fall at a declining rate with an
increase in production experience. Evidence of experience effects in construction is small (Gottlieb and Haugbølle
2010) and criticism is extensive.
The general postulate of the experience curve is that it is possible to reduce real (inflation adjusted) production
cost for a particular product or technology when doubling the accumulated volume by a typical sector specific
percentage (approximately 10-30%). This can be written as a logarithmic regression function c = c0q-b,  with  b  as
learning factor, c as the cost for the qth unit and c0 the cost for the first unit. Sometimes the accumulated output is
replaced by accumulated production time as a proxy assuming a constant production flow. The caveat “it is possible”
draws attention to the point that experience curve effects must be managed and it also immunizes the postulate
against falsification as it is always possible to point to mismanagement if the results are not as predicted.
There are many short-term data on learning by workers in construction. The learning curve captures the
productivity increase due to better handling of a specific equipment such as formwork by the crew. Typically, the
maximum productivity is achieved after 5-10 cycles. The experience curve, on the other hand, captures an aggregate
amount of learning over the life-cycle of a product by also considering capital, administrative, research and
marketing costs (Hall and Howell 1985).
Learning in construction is at a minimum the result of individual learning and group learning in a crew. A third
factor is the ability of the organizational members to coordinate their activity (Reagans, Argote and Brooks 2005).
In construction projects this signifies the ability of an organization to transfer knowledge from project to project.
As the data from economics alert us, there are productivity gains which can be derived from economies of scale
as well as from experience. Internal economies of scale allow for investing in more specific equipment, better use of
resources and labor specialization all improving productivity over a certain range of output
Dutton and Thomas (1982) distinguish between autonomous and induced learning. While the former is an
incremental learning process by trial and error, the latter is a cognitive effort. Adler and Clark (1991) emphasize
engineering changes and staff training; one might add management changes when looking at the influences on the
experience curve. Autonomous learning occurs throughout a project while training, engineering and management
changes typically occur between projects resulting from lessons learned.
Data should in the best case allow to distinguish between (1) learning curve and experience curve effects, (2)
individual, team, organizational and inter-project learning, (3) economies of scale and experience and (4)
autonomous and induced learning. This is an impressive shopping list when choosing projects for data collection.
2. Methodology
The basis for the study are four large expressways in Bangkok, Thailand. They were built over a period of more than
ten years between November 1990 and June 2000. The research on these four projects was conducted as case studies
combined with an archival analysis. The latter allows to collect facts (who, what, where, how many, how much) and
the former to elaborate explanations (how, why). Four sources of evidence are used: documents, archival records,
interviews and participant observation (Yin 2003). The four projects allow for a multiple case study design and all
used the same overall technology, segmental bridge construction (Podolny/Muller 1982). Three projects (A, B, D)
were very similar as the same equipment was used (overhead girders); this allows for literal replication. The other
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project (C) used an underslung girder for the erection of the bridge superstructure. The difference provides an
opportunity for a theoretical replication (Yin 2003). The research design permits therefore within-case analysis as
well as cross-case search for patterns (Eisenhardt 1989).
The core period for data collection lasted from March 1995 to June 1998 and was conducted through case study
and action research (Coughlan/Coghlan 2002). During this time, interviews were conducted and data collected.
Available for the research are detailed project information including time and cost data. The action research was
carried out mainly in Project C, following the steps of (1) data gathering, (2) data feedback, (3) data analysis, (4)
action planning, (5) implementation, (6) evaluation. These steps were used repeatedly. The action research phase
allowed an even deeper emergence in the data than it is possible with other forms of observation. A bias with regard
to the experience curve is not possible since this concept started to arise at a later point during the overall data
analysis. As the cost data are proprietary to the contractors, no monetary values will be given, percentages are used
instead. This is also the reason why an earlier publication of the data seemed inappropriate.
3. Project Descriptions
 Four expressways in Bangkok form the data base for this study. For reasons of anonymity, they are labelled as
projects A to D (table1).
Table 1. Main characteristics of the four expressway projects
Characteristic feature Project A Project B Project C Project D
Location Bangkok, Thailand
Owner Rapid Transit and Expressway Authority of Thailand (ETA)
Contractors German-Thai Joint Venture
Contract form FIDIC Design/build Contract
Contract Volume (nominal value) 218 million US$ 383 million US$ 1,000 million US$ 244 million US$
Superstructure (bridge deck) 20 km 35 km 55 km 10 km
Bridge deck area 220,000 m² 365,000 m² 1,850,000 m² 248,000 m²
Height (average) 12 m 12 m 18 m 12 m
It becomes evident from table 1 that a ceteris paribus clause applies to the geography and climate (Bangkok), to
the economy (Thailand), to the owner (ETA), to the contractors (German-Thai Joint Venture), to the contract form
(design/build), to the type of structure (expressway) and to the overall technology (segmental bridge construction).
However, there are also some unwanted but unavoidable variances that need to be considered, i.e. the bridge height,
in-situ soil conditions, local traffic and utility relocation and interference with other construction works. Of
importance are also the consecutive or overlapping design and construction periods (figure 1).
While the overall technology was the same, there were some notable variations with regard to the erection
equipment and the erection processes. For projects A, B and D overhead girders were used. For Project C a mix of
the same overhead girders and underslung girders was employed (6 and 5 respectively) because of changes to the
design of the superstructure. The three projects made mostly use of a segment for three traffic lanes, designated D3
with a maximum width of 15.60 m. For Project C new segments were designed to carry six lanes (D6). This implied
a new design to the substructure as well and changes to the main quantities involved (table 2).
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Fig. 1. Construction periods for the four expressway projects
The variations with regard to the erection equipment become clearer when comparing the two types of segments
in fig. 2. In Project C, six overhead girders were used for 600.000 m² and five underslung girders for 1,250,000 m².
Table 2. Main quantities for the four projects
Characteristic feature Project A/B Project C Project D
Total concrete volume 0.97 m³/m² 0.95 m³/m² 0.88 m³/m²
Total reinforcement 156 kg/m² 112 kg/m² 115 kg/m²
Total post-tensioning 25 kg/m² 26 kg/m² 25 kg/ m²
Concrete volume superstructure 0.51 m³/m² 0.49 m³/m² 0.51 m³/m²
Reinforcement superstructure 70.6 kg/m² 59.2 kg/m² 70.6 kg/m²
Post-tensioning superstructure 24.4 kg/m² 24.0 kg/m² 24.4 kg/m²
Fig. 2. Comparison overhead girder with D3 segment (left) and underslung girder with D6 segment (right)
4. Cost data
There are numerous problems with data for experience curves in construction: (1) Production unit. The
construction industry is producing unique and not mass products. As structures vary considerably, we cannot
compare  one  building  to  another  or  two bridges.  (2)  Costs  to  determine  learning.  These  are  most  important  as  we
need cost data and these are the costs for the contractor, not for the employer. Data given in a literature review by
Gottlieb and Haugbølle (2009) seem to be largely the contract prices. The underlying assumption when reverting to
prices is that profits are always similar. This does not hold true in construction. (3) Time to determine learning.
Construction projects are not continuous, there are gaps and overlaps between projects that influence learning. (4)
Differences between projects. Even for similar projects there are differences and these must be taken into
consideration. A most important factor is the project complexity. (5) Construction technology. Strictly speaking, in
construction we can never employ the same technology. The site layout and with it the site installation (as factory)
as well as the soil conditions always depend on the project. What constitutes a technology needs to be defined. (6)
Starting point. In a mature industry someone will always have some experience with almost any technology. This
makes it difficult to determine the starting point and has a big impact on the experience curve. (7) Inflation. Inflation
data are easy to obtain, however, the construction business cycle is often not aligned with the average consumer
ID Start Finish Duration
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1 118w03.02.199301.11.1990
2 131w03.10.199601.04.1994
4 166w05.06.200001.04.1997
230w26.11.199903.07.1995
Project A
Project B
Project D
Project C
Project
3
Q1
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price index. In addition, housing, industrial building and civil engineering follow their own price development paths,
there exist considerable differences.
Products in construction are large, expensive and unique. They cannot be compared and be assumed to be equal.
This is an important difference to mass production. In quantity surveying the usual yardstick to compare prices are
square meters or cubic meters. For bridges the unit of choice is square meter of superstructure – or deck – area.
When comparing the deck areas of bridges three further aspects must be considered that impact the cost per square
meter. The span length is of utmost importance as bending moments increase with the square of the length. Soil
conditions can almost be as important as span length. A lesser weight bears the bridge height.
The difference between the owner’s contract price and the contractor’s cost is the contractor’s profit or loss.
Project A had a neutral result,  Project B a profit of 19%, Project C a loss of 34% and Project D a profit of 3%. It
becomes evident that working with prices distorts the data beyond repair. For the four chosen projects, cost data are
available. Utility relocation, escalation, taxes and fees, interest during construction and overhead costs vary and will
not be part of building experience with regard to the construction of an expressway, they need to be subtracted. The
precast yard for the projects A, B and D was provided by the owner, the costs for the precast yard for Project C are
therefore subtracted.
The span length is for all projects similar, around 42 m on average. The soil conditions for the chosen four
projects are also comparable, they are all constructed in the delta of the Chao Phraya River. The top layer is
composed of soft clay on top of sand layers. The height difference must be considered. An adjustment would require
a structural analysis, a take-off and an estimate. This is not possible. Instead we will take typical prices as weights
and reduce the substructure costs in relation to the quantities in a linear way (table 3).
Table 3. Adjustment for different bridge heights (12 and 19 m)
Quantity Project C (19 m) Project D (12 m)
Concrete volume substructure / costs (200 €/m³) 0.46 m³/m² 92 €/m² 0.37 m³/m² 74 €/m²
Reinforcement substructure / costs (700 €/t) 59.2 kg/m² 41 €/m² 44.0 kg/m² 31 €/m²
Post-tensioning substructure / costs (2,500 €/t) 0.4 kg/m² 1 €/m² 0 0
Sum 134 €/m² 105 €/m²
The ratio between super- and substructure costs is approximately 1:1. Therefore, the direct costs for project C will
be reduced by 0.5*(134/105–1)*100 = 14%. Table 4 lists the costs as percentages for different items. The data for
Project A are not known in detail, overall the costs for Project B were 20% less. This will be assumed to apply to all
items.
Table 4. Costs for the four projects
Cost Item Project A Project B Project C Project D
Direct costs 100 % 80 % 57 % 79 %
Plant and equipment 100 % 80 % 54 % 49 %
Launching girders 100 % 80 % 147% 80 %
Site installation 100 % 80 % 45 % 54 %
Design 100 % 80 % 52 % 99 %
Running costs 100 % 80 % 61 % 52 %
Financial costs 100 % 80 % 98 % 61 %
Total net costs 100 % 80 % 57%  73 %
The overall time data are easy to compute from table 1 (volume) and fig. 1 (construction time). With these values
the construction speed can be calculated. However, as different types and quantities of equipment are used,
adjustments become necessary. One can always work faster if there is more equipment at hand. The critical path in
bridge construction starts with the foundation and then moves into the superstructure. Superstructure equipment
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accordingly determines construction speed. An adjustment is made based on the relative costs for the superstructure
launching girders.
Table 5. Learning based on time
Cost Item Project A Project B Project C Project D
Volume 220.000 m² 365.000 m² 1.850.000 m² 248.000 m²
Construction time 118 weeks 131 weeks 230 weeks 166 weeks
Construction speed 1,864 m²/week 2,786 m²/week 8.043 m²/week 1,494 m²/week
Learning (% change) 100 % 67 % 23 % 125 %
Launching girder use 100 % 110 % 184 % 61 %
Adjusted learning (% change) 100 % 73 % 42 % 76 %
Project C had a delay caused by the owner of 11 months. He could not provide the access to the right of way as
stipulated in the contract schedule and accepted a time claim of the same amount. There is little doubt that the
original construction time would have been kept by the contractor (42 months or 182 weeks). The actual percentage
for adjusted learning was at 34 %. Between Project C and the other projects we can observe a quantum leap. This is
due to the change in design. The D6 segments and the underslung girder allow placing 1,140 m² every two days with
one girder against 655 m² every two days previously with D3 segments and overhead girders.
Whether there happened some unlearning between Projects A and B due to the disruption of 14 months cannot be
deducted from the data but it is unlikely as the same core people moved from one to the other project.
The complexity of the project certainly has an influence on construction cost and inter-project learning. The
higher the complexity, the higher the costs. Often but not always is complexity related to volume. In the case of the
four projects complexity is directly related to volume as a ceteris paribus clause applies to most other factors, with
the exception of the location. The complexity was highest for Project C and diseconomies of scale must be expected.
The location and interruption by traffic was also worst for Project C.
There is a marked change in construction technology from Projects A, B and D to Project C with use of the D6
segments. This enabled faster construction. However, it had little influence on learning. Basically the same core
group in top management, staff and labor moved from Project A to B to D. The core knowledge group for the
superstructure erection proved to be the crew supervisors for each girder. Although only 25 % experienced
supervisors started in Project C, the planned cycle of 2 days per span was achieved after six spans for the first time
and after ten spans continuously for the first D6 girder. Given that this first girder erected approximately 310 spans,
this  hardly  matters.  Looking  from  ex  post,  the  two  technologies  can  be  regarded  as  similar.  There  seems  to  be  a
certain robustness as what can be interpreted as a technology.
The German contractor had used segmental bridge construction prior to the projects in Bangkok. There are no
data to inform us about the exact extent. From interviews an assumption of 300,000 m² seems to be justified. It is
completely unclear how much of the experience was transferred to Bangkok. Assuming a transfer of 66%, we have a
starting point at 200.000 m². It must be admitted that these assumptions are somewhat heroic. This problem will
always persist when we look out for experience effects in construction and it cannot be solved satisfactorily.
Table 6. Inflation adjustment
Cost Item Project A Project B Project C Project D
Inflation date January 1992 August 1995 December 1997 December 1998
Overall inflation 100 % 116 % 134 % 144 %
Nominal costs 100 % 80 % 57%  73 %
Real costs 100 % 69 % 43 % 51 %
Typically construction has a start-up phase that is longer than dismantling. The central point of construction is
therefore shifted somewhat to the end. Generalizing this point to be 55% after the start, this gives us the points for
569 Christian Brockmann and Horst Brezinski /  Procedia Economics and Finance  21 ( 2015 )  563 – 570 
which to consider inflation. In table 6, the values are given for overall inflation (International Monetary Fund, World
Bank).
5. Construction of the experience curve
The standard experience curve can be constructed with the presented data. A problem is the experience gained prior
to the projects in Bangkok. The estimated cumulated amount was 200,000 m² with a 66% retention rate on a 20 %
experience effect (13%). Experience effects are summarized for the 50% completion point of the project, see table 7.
The calculated data are somewhat close to an 80 % theoretical learning curve but the data fluctuate considerably
around the theoretical values. Especially off are the values for Project A and Project D.
Table 7. Overall experience curve data for Project A, B, C and D
Project volume [m²] Cumulated production [m²] Theoretical value (80 %) Experience effect
Starting point 200,000 100,000 100 % 100 %
Project A 220,000 310,000 69 % 87 %
Project B 365,000 603,000 56 % 60 %
Project C 1,850,000 1,710,000 40 % 37 %
Project D 248,000 2,759,000 34 % 44 %
6. Data interpretation
Table 7 depicts the overall experience curve. Nested within the experience curve are learning curve effects. These
became especially visible when starting to use a new girder for erection. The first girder for the D6 segments in
Project C had a learning effect for the first six cycles as: 36 days / 6 / 4 / 3 / 4 / 2. After 10 cycles the effect levelled
off to two days as planned. The second girder started with 12 days for the first cycle. So there is a learning effect
transmitted from girder to girder. This learning effect was already considered for project planning, albeit not in the
magnitude as experienced. Similar learning effects showed up for the D3 girders and for the formwork for the piers.
The carriers of the most intimate knowledge were the supervisors for the girder operations together with
engineers involved in the design and method statements of the girders. The supervisors stayed with their crews, the
engineers disseminated learning from one crew to the next. Of course, there was also communication between the
supervisors. The easiest way to detect experience effects is by observing construction speed. However, construction
speed does not always become visible, as there exist barriers. For example when producing segments in one day
cycles, 10 hours of that cycle are reserved for hardening of the concrete. This makes it impossible to produce two
segments per day. It was almost as difficult to reduce erection time for the superstructure spans, here the critical
point was the installation of external post-tensioning which took most of the cycle time and could not be
significantly improved. Nevertheless, one crew achieved at the end one day cycles over a period of six months. This
is a strong indication of crew learning.
Organizational learning could be clearly observed from project to project. Project A exhibited in the beginning no
learning curve effects. This is known from the S-model of learning curves (Yelle 1979). All other projects showed
clear learning effects from the beginning. Once it was learned how to operate the girders in Project A, experience
was carried from project to project.
Disturbing are the data for Project D as they strongly deviate from a theoretical learning curve. It was explained
that the management, staff and workers moved from Project A to B to D. Project A was under a lot of pressure due
to lack of performance and zero profit. The move to Project B showed the desired results, almost in the magnitude of
a 20% learning rate and the profit was enviable at 19%. The team received a lot of praise before moving on to
Project D. Why change a stellar performance? – Of course because of the experience curve but that was not
considered! In Project C a lot of pressure was exerted from the beginning to drive down the costs as the contract
price per unit was only 50% of Project B and D. Despite driving down costs at a learning rate of more than 20%, a
570   Christian Brockmann and Horst Brezinski /  Procedia Economics and Finance  21 ( 2015 )  563 – 570 
loss of 38% was the net result. Organizational learning can profit from setting goals along the guidelines of the
experience curve.
Plant and equipment, launching girders, site installation, design and running costs for staff should exhibit signs of
economies of scale. This cannot be deducted from the data in table 4. Plant and equipment, launching girders, and
running costs are smaller in comparative values for Project D than for Project C with 7.5 times the volume! Direct
costs are smaller for Project C and this could be due to more specialization and better use of resources. The data are
contradictory and this also depends on the different complexities of the projects. The result is that no economies of
scale are discernable.
Induced learning is very clear between Projects B and C (fig. 2). The construction speed between these two
projects increased by 289% due to induced learning. Autonomous learning is visible in the learning curves and the
doubling of the erection speed by one out of five crews in Project C. This is equivalent to an overall speed increase
of only 3% for the project. Induced learning in construction as a form of organizational learning is much more
important than autonomous learning.
7. Conclusions
Cost data in general are never precise even in mass production. In construction they are even less precise, they
are estimates because the quantities produced are never exact when doing cost control in the middle of a project. In
addition, there are numerous side effects, noticeably change orders, which are difficult to evaluate. Project C has not
been financially closed 14 years after handover. This raises strong concerns about the exactness of project
evaluations. Given the difficulties in estimating construction projects and especially megaprojects we always have to
expect estimating errors (Milgrom 1989). Prices as a basis for research on the learning curve must therefore be ruled
out in construction.
The data show without doubt ex post that there are learning effects. However, the differences in table 7 between a
theoretical experience curve and the calculated values forbid using this effect to predict costs ex ante. The difference
for  Project  D  is  29  %  or  71  million  US$!  A  simple  causation  between  production  volume  and  costs  is  not
discernable. The concept is much more complicated with a number of complementing or conflicting influences that
depend on the single project. Neglecting any one of these influences in an ex ante evaluation might spell financial
disaster for the project.
What remains for the construction industry is to use the experience effects as a management tool to formulate
goals irrespective of the estimate. An increase in the construction firm’s activity can lead to learning and experience
effects contributing to lower costs. It depends then on the specifics of the focal project whether these targets will be
achieved. However, apart from the goal of achieving cost leadership there may be other successful strategies for a
company such as product differentiation and market segmentation.
References
Adler, P., Clark, K., 1991. Behind the Learning Curve: A Sketch of the Learning Process. Management Science, 37(3), 267-281.
Boston Consulting Group, 1970. Perspectives on Experience, Boston Consulting Group, Boston.
Coughlan, P., Coghlan, D., 2002. Action Research for Operations Management. International Journal of Operations & Production Management,
22(2), 220-240.
Denison, E., 1985. Trends in American Economic Growth 1929 – 1982, Brookings Institution, Washington.
Dutton, J., Thomas, A., 1982. Progress Functions and Production Dynamics, New York University, Business School Working Paper 82-29.
Eisenhardt, K., 1989. Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of Management Review, 14(4), 532-550.
Gottlieb, S., Haugbølle, K., 2010. The Repetition Effect in Building and Construction Works, Danish Building Research Institute, Aalborg
University.
Hall, G.; Howell, S., 1985. The Experience Curve from the Economist’s Perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 6(3), 197-212.
Milgrom, P., 1989. Auctions and Bidding: A Primer. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3), 3-22.
Podolny, W., Muller, J., 1982. Construction and Design of Prestressed Concrete Segmental Bridges, Wiley, New York.
Reagans, R., Argote, L., Brooks, D. 2005. Individual Experience and Experience Working Together: Predicting Learning Rates from Knowing
Who Knows What and Knowing How to Work Together. Management Science, 51(6), 869-881.
Yelle, L., 1979. The Learning Curve: Historical Review and Comprehensive Survey. Decision Science, 10(2), 302-328.
Yin, R., 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage, Thousand Oaks.
